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What is the Philosophy of Law?
John Finnisl
Abstract: The philosophy of law is not separate from ethics and political philosophy,
but dependent upon them. It extends them by that special attention to the past (of
sources, constitutions, contracts, acquired rights, etc.) which-for reasons articulated
by the philosophy of law-is characteristic of juridical thought. Positivism is coherently sustainable only as a thesis of or topic within natural law theory, which adequately incorporates it but remains engaged with ethical and political issues and
challenges, both perennial and peculiar to this age. The article concludes by proposing a task for legal philosophy in coming years, in light of the fact that legal systems
are not simply sets of norms.
Keywords: General Jurisprudence, Positivism, Natural Law

I. Legal, Political and Moral Philosophy
Like ethics and political philosophy, the parts of philosophy on which it is directly
dependent, the philosophy of law belongs to the philosophy of practical reason.
Practical reason, and thus the philosophy of practical reason (philosophical because considering the problems of practical reason in their full universality), seeks
to make reasonable the deliberations and choices by which human persons shape
their freely chosen actions and thus shape also themselves and their communities.
Ethics considers those problems in the form in which they confront each individual without exception, in the predicament of choice of significant conduct
(action or inaction), choice which, shaping the world, will also shape his or her
own character. Political philosophy (subsuming without absorbing the philosophy
of the household and family) considers the problems confronting each of us
precisely insofar as we need to act in concert with other members of our communities, as members or leaders whose choices are choices for the community to

I Biolchini Family Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame; Professor of Law and Legal
Philosophy Emeritus, University of Oxford. Email: john.finnis@law.ox.ac.uk. This article was originally written for the first issue of the Italian Association of Legal Philosophy's new Rivista di
Filosofia del Diritto in 2012. Contributors were invited to address first the general question What
is Philosophy of Law? and then three specified sub-issues: Is there a difference between Jurisprudence
and Philosophy of Law? Natural Law or Positivism? Is legal normativity distinct from moral normativity? Hence the article's structure. Opportunity has been taken to make some emendations and
amplifications, mainly in the footnotes.
0 The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of University of Notre Dame. All rights
reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.
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whose actions we intend our own actions to contribute. The philosophy of law
(legal philosophy) extends and specifies political philosophy by considering precisely how far choices made today for one's political community's future should
be determined or shaped by choices made and acts made in the past, in the form of
contracts, wills, constitutions, legislative enactments, customs, judicial decisions,
and the like.
That question is itself the topic of a number of "general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations," 2 fundamental principles which enter directly
into the needed determinations. The philosophy of law identifies the grounds
for accepting those principles as appropriate (just) and authoritative, along with
the grounds for judging appropriate and authoritative the different kinds of private and public law-making and rights-affecting acts (juridical acts) mentioned
above. Just as ethics looks to fulfillment in all the basic forms of human good, so
far as choices and actions can bear on or be opposed to that fulfillment, and just as
political philosophy looks to the bearing of choices and actions on the common
good of a political community-on the fulfillment and human rights of all its
members-so. the philosophy of law finds the grounds for accepting the justice of
fundamental principles of law and the authoritativeness of private and public
juridical acts in the specific bearing of those principles and acts on the
common good. That common good extends with meaningful continuity from
the past in which members of the community chose those acts (as against alternatives, reasonable and unreasonable) into the present which those acts intended
to determine beneficially, and in which today's members can similarly determine
(in due measure) the future fulfillment of the same historically extended community and its members.

2 Statute of the International Court ofJustice, art. 38(1)(d). In NaturalLaw andNaturalRights, 2d
ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) [NLNR], 288, I offer a brief list:

Starting with... second-order maxims favouring continuity in human affairs-i.e. favouring
the good of diachronic order, as distinct from the good of a future end-state-we can trace a
series of related second-order principles which include the principle of stability but more and
more go beyond it to incorporate new principles or values. In each case these are available in
first-order form to guide a legislator. Prose-form requires a linear exposition here which
oversimplifies and disguises their interrelations: (i) compulsory acquisition of property
rights to be compensated, in respect of damnum emergens (actual losses) if not of lucrum
cessans (loss of expected profits); (ii) no liability for unintentional injury, without fault; (iii) no
criminal liability without mens rea; (iv) estoppel (nemo contra factum proprium venire potest);
(v) no judicial aid to one who pleads his own wrong (he who seeks equity must do equity);
(vi) no aid to abuse of rights; (vii) fraud unravels everything; (viii) profits received without
justification and at the expense of another must be restored; (ix) pacta sunt servanda (contracts
are to be performed); (x) relative freedom to change existing patterns of legal relationships by
agreement; (xi) in assessments of the legal effects of purported acts-in-the-law, the weak to be
protected against their weaknesses; (xii) disputes not to be resolved without giving both sides
an opportunity to be heard; (xiii) no one to be allowed to judge his or her own cause.
These "general principles of law" are indeed principles. That is to say, they justify, rather than
require, particular rules and determinations, and are qualified in their application to particular
circumstances by other like principles. Moreover, any of them may on occasion be outweighed and
overridden (which is not the same as violated, amended, or repealed) by other important components of the common good, other principles of justice. Nor is it to be forgotten that there are
norms of justice that may never be overridden or outweighed, corresponding to the absolute
human rights.
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The reach of the philosophy of law is thus the reach of Aristotle's
nomothetik 3 and Aquinas's legis positio,4 which he understood as extending
beyond the philosophy-the "practical science"-whose philosophical truth fits
one to participate in constitution-making and legislation, and as including also
(subordinate to the constituent and legislative as such) the art and wisdom needed
by the judge, not to mention the civic understanding, law-abidingness, and critical allegiance of the good citizen. 5
To inform its understanding of the goods common to all human persons,
including all that can be philosophically envisaged about human fulfillment,
the philosophy of law (and of laws) draws directly upon ethics. That understanding takes the form of practical reason's very first principles, directing each of us to
all the basic human goods (each an irreducible aspect of human flourishing), and
of the specifically moral principles that direct us to choose and act reasonably,
faced as we are with not one good but many, not one way of realizing each good
but many, and not one person in whom these goods can be realized, respected or
disrespected but many. For its understanding of the common good of families, of
other associations of civil society, and of the state, the philosophy of laws draws
directly upon political philosophy. That understanding includes what can be said
in general, on the basis of wide human experience, about the factual conditions of
co-existence and cooperation in political life and collective action, conditions
which statecraft and law-making need to take fully into account and which therefore are part of the matter of political and legal philosophy. An elementary example of such conditions is the fact that unanimity about specific forms of
communal life and action is not practically attainable or available as a source of
cooperation in the life of a political community. This practically necessitates and
justifies the concept and institutions of authority, taken as justifying, albeit presumptively and defeasibly, the obligation of compliance with authoritative directives (legislative, judicial or executive, etc.). 6 Or again, elementary facts about the
3 Nicomachean Ethics [NE] X.14: 1181b20.
4 Aquinas, In Eth. X.16 nn. 11-17; III Sent. d. 33 q. 3 a. 1 sol. 4c.
5 Aquinas, 111 Sent. d. 33 q. 3 a. 4 sol. 6c: "justice is in the judge as in a regulator, and is in others as
in the regulated. Still, there are two aspects to judging: (i) bringing about equalities in other persons,
which involves the making of law, and (ii) punishing those who bring about inequality, which is a
matter of retributive justice" [iustitia ... est in iudice sicut in regulante, et est in aliis sicut in regulatis.
Ad iudicem autem duo pertinent: unum est quod aequalitates in aliis faciat, et ad hoc est legispositiva;
aliud est ut inaequalitatem facientes puniat, et ad hoc est vindicativa].
6 See "Positivism and 'Authority,"' essay 4 in The Collected Essays ofJohn Finnis (Oxford: Oxford
University Press 2011), vol. IV [CEJFIV]; NLNR ch. IX. For a more ample and dialectical discussion
of the grounds of authority (with its correlative obligation), see now Finnis, "Freedom, Benefit and
Understanding: Reflections on Laurence Claus's Critique of Authority," San Diego Law Review
(2014) 51 (forthcoming). An excerpt:
To have authority is to be in a position to bring it about that others are under a duty that,
precisely as such, they would not be under but for that exercise of authority. This duty, as I
have said, should not be conceived as having as its proper correlative a right to be obeyed.
Rather, the duty, if owed to anyone, is owed to those persons for the sake of whom (and of
whose wellbeing) the authority was conferred or is (and is to be) acknowledged.This is why it
is a severe degeneration of thought, and of communal life, for politicians to conceive themselves as, or be automatically assumed by journalists to be, seeking or wielding power.
To confer authority on someone-or to accept and exercise it-for reasons other thanfor the
sake of the common good is, presumptively, unjust and contemptible. (The common good in
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limitations of human foresight justify the institution or practice we call equity
(departure from the letter of the established law in the interests of its underlying
purposes and justice).
On these bases, philosophy of law extends ethics and political philosophy into
the domain of the specifically legal. That domain, as I said above, is characterized
by its rooting of grounds for present decisions about the future in facts about the
past. Those facts are the positive sources of law, whether in express legislation, or in
the practice and customs of the judiciary or others, or in publicly available doctrine
of scholarly jurists. The sources are interpreted as yielding a set of normative
propositions (about powers as well as obligations) which in turn are interpreted
so as to be coherent in a sense richer and more demanding than mere avoidance of
direct contradiction at the point of their full specification as norms of choice and
action. Each such set of propositions-"the legal system," "the law of the land,"
"our law," etc.-is taken to be applicable, in principle in its entirety, to every person
and fact within its jurisdiction. And the validity of each proposition of law in the
legal system is taken to be controlled by other propositions within the set, and to be
a precondition for its applicability to particular persons and facts.
Concepts such as jurisdiction and validity are not, in their substance, unknown to
political philosophy; they are already implicit in Aristotle's discussion of the desirability of a Rule of Law (Rechtsstaat).7 But they remain rather implicit and unarticulated until the philosophy of law takes them up out of legal discourse. It does so
precisely to explain why each legal system appropriately develops these (and other)
concepts as technical devices for ensuring that the rules and institutions of a legal
system can relatively often do what philosophical reasoning and political deliberation
as such often cannot do, viz., deliver an unequivocal answer to some relatively
specific question about what will be the right choice and conduct in a specific,
question may be that of a family or other restricted private grouping, as with the authority of the
executor of a will; or it may be of a university-or department--or other corporation; or of a
military unit; or of the sorts of political community we call states; or of bodies established to look
to even wider aspects of the human race's wellbeing.) Of course, any exercise of authority will be
futile unless those whose duties and powers it purports to change do in fact, by and large, act or
dispose themselves to act accordingly. . . . [A]uthority is empty unless its exercise can be predicted
to change behavior (and dispositions) in line with the propositional content of its exercise-of the
rule enacted or court-order made, et cetera. But this does not entail that that propositional content
is itself predictive, or would be more (or even as) beneficial if it were. Even to translate it into a
prediction is to replace its point and substance with a mere (indispensable) precondition of (one
means among others to), and/or mere (albeit inevitable) side effect of, its efficacy.
The point of law is to change things for the better in the community whose law it is. Its
substance is the prescribing of patterns of conduct as to be chosen by those subject to the law. (That
"to be" is the idiom not of prediction but of prescription-as with the doctor's prescription to the
pharmacist.) Law is a modality of coordinating for the sake of common benefit. Beyond a minimal
level of complexity (roughly two persons with a simple objective), the coordination indispensable
for common benefit cannot be achieved without some exercise and acknowledgement of authority-both exercise and acknowledgment being in good faith for that common benefit. Legal authority, and thus law, is authority deployed according to rules for its deployment, with rules about
the making and applying of the rules, and about the consequences of non-compliance with them.
Predictable efficacy (at least, a relatively low level of non-compliance) is a precondition and in that
sense a necessary means. But an even more inherently necessary means is this: the law and its rules
being understood and accepted as prescriptive (even when the formulation of the rule is indicative
in its grammar) in a relatively strong sense, such that the prescription is taken by its addressee(s) as
presumptively excluding some otherwise attractive option or options.
6
7 See especially Politics 3. 1 .1287a.
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indeed (in eventual applications) particular situation. The capacity of positive lawthe set of propositions of law of our legal system-to deliver such determinate
answers is one primary way in which it links together the past, present and future
of the community, gives effect to legitimate expectations or at least to legally acquired
rights-including rights of property, contractual and quasi-contractual rights, trusts,
rights of compensation and restitution, and so forth-and thus makes possible a vast
expansion of economic and cultural life and relatively secure and autonomous familial and individual choice of conduct and vocation. All this is a part of political
philosophy and the political art, a part so extended and specialized as to deserve its
distinct (not separate!) place and name, philosophy of law.

II. Jurisprudence or Philosophy of Law?
If we follow the unequivocal and salutary example of Aquinas, we will make no
distinction between lex and ius when the latter term signifies what it signifies in, for
example, the phrases ius civile or ius naturale-phrasesused by St Thomas entirely
synonymously with lex civilis and lex naturalis respectively.8 Hence "jurisprudence"
and "philosophy of law" can appropriately be used entirely synonymously, as is
usual in English-speaking countries. Of course, both etymological elements in the
word "jurisprudence" have some gravitational pull (far from irresistible) towards the
relatively more particularized, less universal and hence less philosophical. 9 But just
as Aquinas treats legispositio as a name not only for the highly particular business of
making laws but also for the supreme level of politica, political philosophy/theory,
and treats politica as philosophy that is on the same level as philosophia moralisindeed, as being a branch or kind, supremely dignified, of philosophia moralis'o-so
too we can rightly take jurisprudence and philosophy of law alike as ranging from
the exploration of specific juridical techniques (critically investigating these techniques' rational foundations in considerations of human flourishing and moral
right) all the way up to the highest and widest principles and other considerations
of moral and political theory.

III. Natural Law Theories and Positivism
Since "natural law," in the present context, has the same reference as "the
normative principles and standards of ethics and politics" (or "normative
8

See Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Politicaland Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998)

[Aquinas], 135.

9 But that pull is not irresistible, as we can see from the opening sentences (from Ulpian) of
Justinian's Institutes, sentences that remain sound: "Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius
suum cuique tribuere. lurisprudentia est divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia, iusti atque
iniusti scientia. Justice is the steady and lasting willingness to accord to everyone his or her rights.
Juristic wisdom, by its knowledge of divine and human realities, critically distinguishes the just from
the unjust."
10 In Eth. prol. (I.1 n. 6) and I. 2 nn. 1-12 (which call the other branches ethics (monostica) and the
philosophy of the household (oeconomica)); Aquinas, 114-5.
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political philosophy"), everything said so far in this article is a piece of natural
law theory. That theory autonomously yields, as one of its intrinsic elements,
the thesis that human societies need positive law, and an account of many
needed features of law, legal systems, and the Rule of Law. Natural law
theory, in this context, is just another name for legal philosophy. It is fully
positivist, if by that we mean that, properly pursued, it yields a completely
sufficient account of the concept and characteristic institutions and sources of
positive law and the Rule of Law. There is no proper place for a positivism
outside natural law theory.11
The (legal) positivism that is self-conceived as somehow in opposition to natural law theory is (just in so far as it both maintains that self-identification and
includes theses differing from those of natural law theory)12 a set of more or less
confused and arbitrarily truncated theories, conceived in some instances on the
basis of grave misunderstanding13 of the tradition of natural law theory and of
some of its theorems, and in other instances as simply the expression of moral
skepticism (denial that there are any true propositions about human good and
moral right)-and in some instances again, such as Kelsen, on both bases. Neither
basis is defensible. Misunderstandings should be abandoned, by attending to
the classic texts with more care. Skepticism about practical truth may seem at

II See further CEJFIVessays 1, 5 and 7; and Finnis, "Natural Law Theory: Its Past and Its Present",
in Routledge Companion to the Philosophy ofLaw, ed. Andrei Marmor (New York: Routledge, 2012).
There is, of course, place for accurate historical and strictly descriptive doctrinal accounts of particular legal systems. But these do not have the character of theory or philosophy. See now also Finnis,
"Law as Fact and as Reason for Action: A Response to Robert Alexy on Law's 'Ideal
Dimension,"'AmericanJournalofjurisprudence 59 (2014): 96-100.
12 Note that it is not clear how far these two characteristics are to be found in theories or theoretical
stances such as those ofJohn Gardner and Leslie Green, or even (at least much of the time) of Joseph
Raz. For these theorists, each in his own way, accept that philosophy of law legitimately contains
theses-perhaps numerous-which cannot be called positivist and are theses of morality and/or
moral philosophy; each regards as positivist only the narrow thesis that positive law is identified
by reference only to social-fact sources, a thesis explicitly compatible with the position that judges
may legitimately and often ought to reason "according to law," a law and form of (Raz says) "legal
reasoning" that includes (besides positive law identifiable from social-fact sources) also moral principles (even, according to Raz, if there is no positive law even tacitly authorizing such judicial resort to
moral principles): see the passages from Raz and Gardner quoted and cited in CE]F IV, 9 and 188,
and the passage from Green quoted ibid., 247, ending his article expounding and defending legal
positivism:
Evaluative argument is, of course, central to the philosophy of law more generally. No legal
philosopher can be only a legal positivist. A complete theory of law requires also an account
of what kinds of things could possibly count as merits of law (must law be efficient or elegant
as well as just?); of what role law should play in adjudication (should valid law always be
applied?); of what claim law has on our obedience (is there a duty to obey?); and also of the
pivotal questions of what laws we should have and whether we should have law at all. Legal
positivism does not aspire to answer these questions, though its claim that the existence and
content of law depends only on social facts does give them shape.
Green, "Legal Positivism," The StanfordEncyclopedia ofPhilosophy (Spring 2003 edn); <http://plato.
stanford.edularchives/spr2003/entries/legal-positivism> (last accessed October 28, 2014).
13 See e.g., CEJF IV: 7-8, 105, 182-6 (the last-mentioned pages being the main part of the essay
"The Truth in Legal Positivism"); NLNR, 363-6.
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first to be a more worthy basis for legal positivism. But, leaving to one side the
responses that can rightly be made to skeptical theses and arguments in ethics
(or "meta-ethics"),i 4 it should be acknowledged that if skepticism is correct, there
is no philosophy of law. At most there can be historical accounts (tracking competent legal practitioners' accounts) of particular communities' accepted or
imposed normative systems self-interpreted as legal, and of systems analogous
to those. The history or set of histories might be eked out by some sort of statistics
concerning frequency or "typicality." But if nothing true can be said about human
good, there is nothing of philosophical import to be thought or said about
normativity, authority, obligation, validity and similar concepts, all of which get
their sense on the presupposition that practical reason can distinguish between
true and false, good reason and lack of reason, and so forth.
As for that attention to fact which positivists think a virtue of their method, it is
fully present and operational in any adequate philosophy of law (natural law
theory). For: practical reason advances in deliberation towards choice (whether
concretely or more universally and abstractly, "philosophically"), and does so by
the use not only of normative premises about the good and the right but also,
indispensably, of factual premises about the conditions in which the good can be
attained or would be harmed. The truth of those premises has to be earned, by
rigorous attention to facts, experience, the typical, the likely, the physically, biologically or psychologically possible, and so forth.
In short: the philosophy of law is best pursued without reliance on such equivocal labels as "positivist" (or "non-positivist"). Should we also dismiss the label
"natural law theory"? Any sound theory or philosophy of law will need to attend
to two broad kinds of principle, norm and standard: those applicable by persons
of practical reasonableness only because of they are standards chosen or otherwise
factually established by past choices of their community, and those that are applicable whether or not so chosen or ratified. For the latter, the history of our
civilization has adopted the name "natural law." The adoption can be traced to
Plato's engagement with the Sophists' theory that more or less egoistic strength
and cunning naturally, and so to say "by right" and reasonably, hold sway in
human deliberation. Plato's brilliant recapturing of "right by nature" from this
sophistical error1 5 has been decisive for our vocabulary, making its way through
Aristotle, the Stoics, Cicero, St Paul, Gaius and Aquinas and their successors
down to the United Nations Charter16 and today. There is no symmetry of
unserviceability between the labels "positivism" and "natural law theory."
though the latter, to be sure, labors under misinterpretations as grave as the
Sophists' and further tangled by a long civilizational sequence of reversions, accretions and quasi-philosophical flotsam and jetsam.

14 See e.g., Finnis, FundamentalsofEthics (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1983),
ch. II; CEJFI, essays 1 to 6.
15 See Finnis, "Natural Law Theory."
16 Art. 51: "Aucune disposition de la pr6sente Charte ne porte atteinte au droit naturelde 16gitime
defense..." Art. 111: "The present Charter, of which the Chinese, French, Russian, English, and
Spanish texts are equally authentic. .. "
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IV. Legal Normativity as Distinct from Moral Normativity

A main reason for wanting to introduce positive law and the Rule of Law is to
resolve disputes within a political community about what morality (especially
justice) requires, recommends, or permits. There is thus good reason to introduce
a way of thinking-call it legal thinking-in which (within undefined but important limits) the sheer fact that a legally ("constitutionally") authorized person
or body of persons has pronounced a determinatio" of some disputed or disputable issue is taken as sufficient ground for affirming the legal validity of the
determinatio and its propositional product (rule, judgment, etc.). In this way of
thinking, issues of the justice or injustice of the determinatio, once it has been
made, are pushed to the margins of the legal domain. Only when moral extremes
are approached do questions of justice and morality become once again relevant.
Thus talk of "validity" can be more or less fully and cleanly reserved to intrasystemic legal (positive-law) discourse, and taken to entail not moral but legal
obligatoriness (an obligatoriness not to be understood reductively as merely liability to penalty or punishment).18
Natural law theory has no quarrel with-indeed, promotes-a distinction or
bifurcation between intra-systemic [legal] validity (and obligatoriness) and legal
validity (and obligatoriness) in the moral sense.19 Indeed, it is not unreasonable
to see such a distinction at work in the famous tag "An unjust law is not a law."
Such a way of speaking is not self-contradictory, paradoxical, or even remarkable:
"an insincere friend is not a friend"; "a logically invalid argument is no argument"; "a quack medicine is not medicine," etc. So too in the famous tag or
theorem: "unjust law" (lex iniusta) here refers to an intra-systemically valid legal
rule or order,2 0 and "not law" (non lex) signifies that, moral limits having been
transgressed, this same law lacks validity (as law) in the moral sense (i.e., legitimacy) and thus, as such, 2 1 lacks moral obligatoriness.
Shifts of meaning of this kind were studied closely by Aristotle in connection
with his accounts of the kinds of equivocation or homonymy, and of what we
would now call analogous predication. A word can be said to be analogical when
its meaning shifts more or less systematically according to context. The kind of
analogy most relevant in the context of human affairs is what Aristotle called pros
hen homonymy. This is where the various relevant meanings of a word are all
See NLNR, 284-6, 294-5, 380; CEJFIV: 2, 12, 123, 128, 131-2, 149, 161, 179-83, and essay 13.
In such a discourse context, one may choose to use "legitimacy" to signify moral relevance,
grounding moral obligatoriness. But "legitimacy" too is not free from ambiguity, since some writers
in contemporary legal theory seem to treat it, perhaps, as synonymous with (purely legal) validity. On
legal and moral validity, see my response to Maris Kapcke Tintur6 in "Reflections and Responses," in
Reason, Morality and Law: The Philosophy ofJohn Finnis, ed. John Keown and Robert P. George
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 553-6.
19 NLNR, 314-20.
20 Of course, the speaker could alternatively be intending to predicate injustice of certain beliefs and
practices-observable as social facts of acknowledgement of certain acts and facts as laws-while not
intending to assess legal validity even in a technical, constrained and amoral sense.
21 Compliance with it may to some extent remain morally obligatory, because of the unjust sideeffects of (public) non-compliance: NLNR, 361. On these problems, see now Finnis, "Law as Fact
and as Reason for Action," 100-109.
17

18
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relatable to a focal meaning or sense or use, a meaning which picks out a primary
or central case of the kind of reality or subject-matter under consideration-focal
and central in some context of discourse or inquiry. The non-focal senses and
non-central cases can be thought of as secondary because they are immature or
deviant or in some other way watered-down instances or kinds of the reality, at
least when regarded from some appropriate viewpoint or for some appropriate
theoretical or practical purpose. Legal theorists self-identifying themselves as positivist-that is, as opposing what they think of as natural law theory-have paid all
too little attention to this aspect of our language and its engagement with reality
(and fulfillment). So the entire legal science of a Kelsen will be constructed on
unexamined and simplistic assumptions about the univocality of "law" and the
supposed need for a single form of norm to correspond one-to-one with the
single-feature definition of law as a social order for controlling conduct by
threat of sanction. 2 2 And the near-universal hostility of self-identified positivists
to the lex iniusta non lex theorem overlooks the multivocality of terms such as
"law" and "validity." What is central in one context or for one set of purposes is
secondary in another context or relative to other purposes. Hence the complexity
of the relations between legal validity and law's moral legitimacy, and between
legal obligatoriness in an intra-systemic sense and in a moral sense, manifests itself
in dual poles of centrality: the technical-legal, and the morally conscientious. But
since immoral or amoral projects of law-making and -maintaining are parasitic on
the fuller reasonableness of morally just law, it is the latter pole that has philosophical primacy as well as primacy in the conscience of the legislative reformer
and (with some added complexities of responsibility) in the conscience of the true
(central-case) judge.

V. Legal Philosophy and New Ethical and Political Challenges
Though, as has been said above, law and legal philosophy has a quasi-distinct
domain and technical character, the very idea (concept) of law (an idea without
which no laws will be made or maintained) is so dependent upon wider principles
of moral and political thought and philosophy that neither law nor its philosophy
can avoid engagement with the ethical and political issues and challenges of the
age. Particular aspects of our law's content (including its procedural rules and
institutions) can enhance, or in other cases harm, our community's common
good. The legal instrumentarium can, not infrequently, provide an easy route to
destructive social changes, as the apparatus of human rights litigation has, in
many places, provided an easy route to injustices involved in or connected with
abortion, euthanasia, fraudulent or clandestine migration, and same-sex "marriage," to the oppression of critics of these, and to other destructive evils. But
22 See Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, trans. Anders Wedberg (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1945), 19, 45 ("If 'coercion' in the sense here defined is an essential
element of law, then the norms which form a legal order must be norms stipulating a coercive act,
i.e. a sanction.") The "must" is a non sequitur,as H.L.A. Hart showed in The Concept ofLaw (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1961).
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what social elites desire can very often be achieved without much resort to that
instrumentarium, or even in defiance of it.
It seems to me that the task of legal philosophy today is twofold. It must keep
clear its intrinsic relationship with, and dependence upon, all the truths of moral
and political philosophy, not least by providing a constant critique of every form
of legal philosophy that denies or distorts that relationship. And by its mastery,
and its foundational explanatory understanding, of the law's technical instrumentarium it must remain in a position to criticize and expose-in the hope of
deflecting-every manipulation of it for purposes destructive of the common
good, a good that includes but is not exhausted by the upholding of juridically
cognizable rights.
Of special importance in the coming decades will be a recovery of awareness
amongst legal philosophers that law's paradigmatic form, the sophisticated municipal legal system or lus civile, is the law of a people, 23 posited by a constituent act
(or constitutive custom) and ongoing legislative acts of their self-determination as a
people, acts which can and should be consistent with their obligations to do and
respect right (human rights, as contained in the ius naturale) and their responsibilities towards other peoples and those other peoples' self-determination, rights
and needs. Just as countless thinkers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries too
casually assumed the justice of communist notions of a private-propertyless community, notions inadequately attentive to the long-term conditions of a sustainable,
prosperous and just society of free persons, with the result that countless millions of
people suffered more or less directly from the application in their polities of these
errors of practical thought, so likewise many thinkers today too casually assume
(explicitly or implicitly) the justice of quasi-communist notions of a borderless
humanity, notions incompatible with the long-term conditions of a sustainably
just and civilly free political order and Rule of Law. Even in the short term, this
kind of error of practical thought results in the kind of political community increasingly familiar, whose peoples' multi-cultural internal diversity of ultimate allegiances is both promoted and countered by an ever-growing apparatus of security
and surveillance (rightly fearful of civil war or gross disorder), a severe diminution
in freedom of political and intellectual discourse, and an explosion of law-making
and regulatory bureaucracy indifferent to the benefit of having a society whose selfdetermination takes in large measure the form of that sharing of expectations which
Ulpian and AquinaS24 called common custom.
Practitioners of the philosophy of law may be especially susceptible to this kind
of error, to the extent that they envision legal systems simply as sets of norms,
rather than as the principles, norms and institutions adopted by a people extended
in time and in territorial bounds, in more or less adequate fulfillment of its moral
responsibility to do so. 2 5
See CEJFIV.21, sec. V (pp. 430-4) and n. 25 below.
See Summa Theologiae I-I q. 97 a. 2 (Should human law always be changed when there is
opportunity for making an improvement in it? No.)
25 See CE]F IV: 16; CEJFII, essays 6 ("Law, Universality and Social Identity") and 7 ("Cosmopolis,
Nation States, and Families"), and n. 23 above.
23
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